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and EU-MRV, the verification process is also expected to: a) reduce inconsistencies found in traditional manual records such as BDNs (Bunker Delivery Notes), logbooks, and noon reports, thereby improving data accuracy; b) streamline the verification process, as real-time data lowers the workload required for data aggregation and preparation before verification; and c) strengthen the improvement cycle by enabling operators to identify and correct problematic voyage data prior to verification, which in turn reduces the number of comments during the verification stage.As vessels become increasingly connected and software-driven, how is cyber risk being incorporated into class guides and risk assessments?NK incorporates cyber risk as an integral element of ship safety, addressing it through UR E26/E27 design-stage requirements and through its Cyber Security Management System (CSMS) certification framework at the organisational level.Cyber risk has evolved beyond a standalone IT concern into a safety-critical factor that can directly affect navigation, control systems, and operational reliability. Under UR E26/E27, cyber-resilience requirements are incorporated at the design stage of newbuildings, including network segmentation, local access control, and remote access control, thereby enhancing the cyber resilience of onboard systems.In addition, NK offers its CSMS certification framework to promote structured risk assessment, defined accountability, incident-response preparedness, and continuous improvement processes within organisations.Through these complementary approaches, cyber risk is addressed within a structured safety-management framework that reflects the increasing digitalisation of shipping.What is currently the biggest regulatory or safety barrier to largescale autonomous and remotely operated vessels?There are three main regulatory and safety barriers to the large-scale deployment of autonomous and remotely operated vessels. Firstly, internationally unified legal frameworks and safety standards have not yet been established, which fundamentally hinders widespread implementation. In particular, the boundaries of responsibility remain unclear and need clarification through further international discussions.Secondly, safety levels vary significantly depending on the Concept of Operations (ConOps), which is central to validating the Operational Design Domain (ODD) of Autonomous Navigation Systems (ANS). Furthermore, within the Operational Envelope (OE), ensuring safety depends on effective collaboration between systems and humans, with human operators expected to compensate for system limitations. Determining the appropriate allocation of tasks between humans and automation is therefore essential.Thirdly, validating emergency response procedures is also crucial, as appropriate responses may vary substantially depending on the situation and the ConOps. Addressing these issues requires internationally unified and operationally acceptable technical guidelines.Taken together, these issues highlight the need for harmonised regulation, clarified responsibility, robust systemhuman integration, and scenario-based emergency preparedness before autonomous and remotely operated vessels can be deployed at scale.How is the role of the traditional surveyor changing as classification societies are moving toward digitalisation?With the progress of digitalisation, the role of the traditional surveyor is expanding to encompass data-driven analysis and evaluation. This shift requires more sophisticated judgment rooted in comprehensive risk assessments. While the expertise gained through hands-on, on-site experience remains indispensable, the synergy between professional intuition and advanced digital technologies will further elevate the quality and reliability of the survey process in the years ahead.May 2026 209