Page 174 - ΝΑΥΤΙΚΑ ΧΡΟΝΙΚΑ - SEPT 2025
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Feature
of redundancy required by a nuclear-pow- The usual complement the specific type of reactor technology
ered vessel may be higher than that of of seafarers will utilised aboard ships. This implies a
a conventionally-powered one due to likely continue to detailed understanding of the reactor’s
safety reasons, causing a decrease in per- operate the nuclear operational characteristics, safety proto-
formance. This is particularly true for LNG ships of the future. cols, and emergency response procedures.
carriers with two separate power, propul- Still, additional The establishment of global standards and
sion, and steering plants, which provide highly trained the mutual recognition of certifications
a high level of redundancy compared to personnel will be across jurisdictions will streamline the pro-
little or no redundancy, which is typically required onboard to cess in order to comply with international
the case with single-screw vessels driven monitor the reactor regulations.
by marine diesel engines. during service. Today, the ABS dedicated centres in Hou-
ston, Athens, Doha, and Singapore are
To what extent are flag states and port designed to prepare seafarers for a mul-
authorities prepared to handle ti-dimensional industry with alternative
nuclear-powered ships? fuels and emerging technologies. Our
The UK-based Maritime & Coastguard Athens centre, which has the support of
Agency adopted the IMO’s Code of Safety the Greek Ministry of Maritime Affairs and
for Nuclear Merchant Ships in the Merchant Insular Policy and the Union of Greek Ship-
Shipping (Nuclear Ships) Regulations back owners (UGS), addresses critical emerging
in 2022. The kick-off process for the mod- safety issues such as handling dynamic
ernisation of the IMO A.491(XII) framework, fuels, risks generated by cyber-enabled sys-
which was decided by the 110 session of tems, hybrid battery propulsion and other
th
the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee technology-driven changes onboard. In the
(MSC) in June 2025, implies that flag states future, nuclear shipping could be part of our
and port authorities will become increas- training agenda.
ingly interested in and reflective upon the
goals, objectives, and risks of nuclear ship- Are there concerns regarding radioactive
ping. waste management at sea?
The IMO Irradiated Nuclear Fuel Code
How does nuclear propulsion affect crew (INF Code) accounts for the IAEA require-
training requirements? ments and is mandatory for ships car-
The IAEA offers several updated publica- rying packaged irradiated nuclear fuel,
tions and safety standards addressing the high-level radioactive waste, or plutonium.
education and training of nuclear power Provisions under this code are interlinked
plant personnel, while the IMO STCW Con- with the IMO International Code for the
vention governs the training requirements Construction and Equipment of Ships
for conventional vessels. The updated IMO Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk
Code of Safety for Nuclear Merchant Ships (IBC Code) and the International Maritime
is likely to impact the education and train- Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code. This risk
ing programmes of engineering officers, management framework can reduce the
naval architects, or marine engineers. risks of several types of potentially hazard-
In the future, shipowners, operators, and ous materials carried either in packaged or
their personnel will need to fully understand bulk form. It also addresses risks related to
nuclear propulsion systems. Knowledge of environmental pollution from accidental
the nuclear fuel cycle, radiation protection, release.
emergency procedures, and nuclear reac- Section 2.7 of the IMDG Code reflects the
tor maintenance will be essential. The usual provisions of IAEA requirements on Class 7
complement of seafarers will likely continue radioactive materials. However, only radi-
to operate the nuclear ships of the future. oactive material packaged as cargo is
Still, additional highly trained personnel will considered, and therefore, ships or off-
be required onboard to monitor the reactor shore units using radioactive material for
during service. Training programmes akin to energy production are not applicable. This
those used by naval forces operating nucle- means that the risk-based framework
ar-powered ships could be useful in culti- should be modernised to account for ships
vating expertise among civilian maritime using nuclear power as well as the asso-
personnel. ciated handling of nuclear fuel and other
Training programmes must be tailored to radioactive wastes.
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